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FORTY YEARS ON
Danny Priel*
Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006). x+308pp.

I. INTO THE RING
… In the blue corner—always in the blue corner—we have Ronald “Hercules” Dworkin. He has fought
many fights already, probably too many to remember, won many, but never—this is how it is with
academics—in a knock-out.1 Yes, that’s what’s so amazing about them: even when it looks like they
will not have an answer to that last blow, they always come back with something, always with a new
trick up their sleeve.2 In the other corner, heavyweights Richard Posner, Antonin Scalia, Stanley Fish,
Jules Coleman, Laurence Tribe, Cass Sunstein, Joseph Raz, and Richard Rorty line up, and they are all
here to exchange some well-aimed punches. Dworkin, who hardly slowed down since the days of those
legendary fights with H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller, has added the experience that comes with age to the
agility of his youth, making him adept with all the tools of the academic boxer’s trade: drawing
distinctions, exposing inconsistencies, using the reductio to show how absurd was his opponent’s view,
and of course, the Dworkin trademark move, accusing his opponents of misrepresenting his own views
(e.g., pp. 126, 216-222, 226, 266 n.3, 273 n.16).
But if the viewers, initially so impressed by the dexterity of the mind and firmness of the blows,
now look a little jaded it is because—just like in real boxing—there is just so much one can take home
from such displays, especially when, as is the case here, this is not the first or even the second time that
Dworkin meets these opponents. By now it seems that Dworkin and his rivals know the other’s
maneuvers so well, that they can anticipate all of them. As a result, instead of dazzling performances
what we get is a long series of calculated parries, interspersed by careful jabs: they may cause some
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It probably has something to do with the fact that “[p]eople in the boxing world share the concept of winning a round

even though they often disagree about who has won a particular round and about what concrete criteria should be used in
deciding that question” (p. 10).
2

It helps that participants in academic boxing usually keep their shirts on.

pain, but neither side is going to be forced to give up their game. If necessary they could go on like this
forever.
Just like in the real thing, there is some thrill in seeing those displays, especially when performed
by professionals of the highest order; but it is a rather cheap thrill and the excitement it gives is quickly
forgotten without a trace. Indeed, even Dworkin himself probably felt that his readers might have
hoped for something else, but true to form, he tells us at one point that not stepping into the ring for
yet another round of verbal exchange would be “cowardly” (p. 43)!
What makes the spectacle even more frustrating is that we can see only one of the players.
Exciting as it may sound, in reality it makes the match quite difficult to follow. We are forced to guess
what Dworkin’s opponents say from his own returns. And this often makes it quite difficult to tell
whether Dworkin sticks to the rules of the game.3 After all, we cannot “license one side of a debate to
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”4
Do not get me wrong: serious debate is conducted by advancing arguments and ideas in public so
others could read and challenge them, with the hope that something—perhaps even truth—would
emerge. But the problem with academic debates is that the law of diminishing marginal returns applies
to them with special ferocity with successive responses containing more rhetoric and less substance.5
Given that Justice in Robes contains so much of that, one might wonder whether it is a book worthy of an
extended review, especially by an outsider to the original debates. Perhaps we should all just hang on by
the ropes for the Big League players to come back for yet another round. Such is academic life that we
can be certain that at some point they will.6
3

For the accusation that Dworkin misrepresents others’ views see James Allan, Truth’s Empire—A Reply to Ronald
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There is also a increasing tendency to accuse the other of misrepresenting one’s views, which often serves as starting

point for spin-off debates on the question whether the accusation of misrepresentation is true or not. See, e.g., Richard A.
Posner, Reply to Critics of The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1796, 1797-98 (1998) (arguing
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That is why I hope to do something else in this Review. The polemical style of the book and the
fact that its chapters have all been independently published, make the topics discussed in it seem
unrelated: a defense of the importance of theory here, some criticism of legal positivism there, and
remarks on equality everywhere. What I hope to do is connect these disparate strands into a more
coherent whole. This will allow for a general assessment of the Dworkinian project of explaining and
justifying law as it emerges from this book, instead of taking sides on individual points of disagreement
between Dworkin and his opponents.
But what is the Dworkinian project? In commenting on Dworkin’s work there are usually three
Dworkins being discussed: first, there is Dworkin the legal philosopher of The Model of Rules, the one
who is still best known for his critique of legal positivism; then there is Dworkin the constitutional
scholar of The New York Review of Books and Freedom’s Law, who argues for a “moral reading” of
understanding the United States Constitution and has argued in favor of a particular (“liberal”) answer to
many controversial political issues; the third Dworkin is the moral philosopher of Objectivity and Truth:
You’d Better Believe It, who has argued with great conviction against any kind of relativism or skepticism
about morality. While all three Dworkins figure in Justice in Robes most treatments of Dworkin’s work
(including most reviews of Justice in Robes) focus on one aspect of his work while neglecting the others.
Inevitably, I too will say more on some parts of the book than on others, but one thing that I hope will
emerge from this essay is that the three Dworkins are (unsurprisingly) one: that is, one cannot
understand Dworkin’s legal philosophy without understanding his views on the objectivity of morality
and the active role he assigns to judges in deciding constitutional disputes. I decided to show this by
focusing on Dworkin’s contributions to legal philosophy, because this is a topic to which Dworkin
returns at some length in this book, and also because this is the field to which Dworkin’s contributions
seem to me to have been most significant. Even though my conclusions will often be fairly critical of
Dworkin’s arguments, I will try to show that some of the issues he has raised are significant and deserve
close attention.
Given Dworkin’s prominence this statement may seem odd, but it is not as trivial as it may first
seem. Some legal philosophers, even those who acknowledge the importance of his contribution to
other areas, have recently dismissed Dworkin’s work in legal philosophy as fundamentally mistaken and

response Posner, one not reprinted in Justice in Robes. See Ronald Dworkin, Reply, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 431, 432-45 (1997)
[hereinafter Dworkin, Reply]. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Virtues and Verdicts, NEW REPUBLIC, May 22, 2006, at 32, 34, 37
(reviewing Justice in Robes and responding to Dworkin).
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of little lasting value.7 Others have suggested that his work is concerned with questions so different
from those of other legal philosophers that he might not even properly belong among the ranks of
jurisprudents.8 At least in part this seems like something Dworkin happily acknowledges, as he believes
much of contemporary legal philosophy is misguided (pp. 33-34). Another aim of this Review,
therefore, is to explain why, despite significant methodological differences between Dworkin and other
legal philosophers, his concerns are not very different from theirs, and why, despite deficiencies in his
arguments, his claims cannot be rejected out of hand.

II. HOW TO UNDERSTAND LAW
A. What Is the Question?
In 1964 Ronald Dworkin opened one of his earliest published works with the following words:
What, in general, is a good reason for decision by a court of law? This is the question of jurisprudence; it has
been asked in an amazing number of forms, of which the classic “What is Law?” is only the briefest.9

As he explained, the question of jurisprudence is how to make sense of what the law requires and what
judges should do in order to discover that. Twenty years later in a short paper in which he summarized
his thinking on law, he made it clear that this had been his project all along. He said there that he was
concerned with the question of “the sense of propositions of law … [the question which] asks what these
propositions of law should be understood to mean, and in what circumstances they should be taken to
be true or false or neither.”10 Some forty years after his early essay Dworkin still maintains that his main

Like any other prominent theorist Dworkin had its fair share of criticism. But it has been argued recently that
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Dworkin’s writings have contributed close to nothing of lasting significance to jurisprudence. See Thom Brooks, Book
Review, 69 MOD. L. REV. 140, 142 (2006) (reviewing DWORKIN AND HIS CRITICS (Justine Burley ed., 2004)); Leiter, supra
note 3, at 165-66 (Dworkin’s jurisprudence is “largely without philosophical merit”).
See ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 27 (2d ed. 2005) (claiming that Dworkin’s theory aims
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not just to undermine legal positivism but is a “challenge to analytical jurisprudence”); JULIE DICKSON, EVALUATION

AND

LEGAL THEORY 22-23 & n.31 (2001); cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 240-41 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that Dworkin’s
theory is concerned with different issues than his); MICHAEL S. MOORE, EDUCATING ONESELF IN PUBLIC: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 104, 306 (2000) (same).
9

Ronald Dworkin, Wasserstrom: The Judicial Decision, 75 ETHICS 47, 47 (1964) (book review).
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Ronald Dworkin, Legal Theory and the Problem of Sense, in ISSUES

INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART 9, 9 (Ruth Gavison ed., 1987) [hereinafter ISSUES].
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IN

CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: THE

concern is with understanding what law is “in what I shall call the doctrinal sense,” namely in “what the
law requires or prohibits or permits or creates” (p. 2).
It is already at the very first lines of the article published in 1964 that others concerned with the
question “what is law?” have begun to be puzzled by Dworkin’s approach. For on its face it seems odd to
say that “what is law?” is only a shorter way of saying “what is a good reason for deciding a case?” or
“how should a court decide this particular case?”11 Not only do these sentences seem to have an utterly
different meaning, it does not even seem that answering the first question is particularly helpful for
answering the second. A natural answer to the question “what is law?” would presumably look
something like this: “law is the set of rules in which a state determines certain permissions, prohibitions
and other normative requirements that govern the lives of those under its jurisdiction.” This suggestion
is, no doubt, incomplete and vague, but it does not seem that any elaboration or clarification would give
us anything that is going to be helpful in answering the question how cases should be decided. For this
we need to know the content of the rules in a given jurisdiction, which could be supplemented with a
theory of adjudication or theory of interpretation. And though such theories are probably going to be
related in some way to a theory of law, they do not look like the same thing at all. As one critic of
Dworkin put it, Dworkin offered a theory of adjudication, which he “regard[ed] … willy-nilly and
without further argument as a theory of law.”12
One popular way of making this point is to say that Dworkin fails to distinguish between the
question “what is law (in general)?” and the question “what is the law (applicable in a particular case)?”13
I believe much of the disagreement with, even incomprehension of, Dworkin’s views stems from failure
to understand in what sense the question “what is law?” is similar to Dworkin’s question “how should
judges decide cases?” To see how these two questions are related and why Dworkin might not be guilty
of a misunderstanding so fundamental that it thwarts his theory right from the start we must look first at
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Compare with RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 1 (1986), where Dworkin’s first chapter is entitled “What is Law?”

immediately followed by the explanation that “[i]t matters how judges decide cases.” Id. (emphasis added).
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AND POLITICS 195, 202-03 (rev.

ed. 1994) [hereinafter ETHICS]; see also MARMOR, supra note 8, at 43-44; W.J. WALUCHOW,

INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM 3 (1994).
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For a critique of Dworkin along those lines see, for example, JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN
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POSITIVISM: LAW WITHOUT TRIMMINGS 129 (1999); MOORE, supra note 8, at 94-95; Leiter, supra note 3, at 175-76. Using
different terminology this is also the critique in Green, supra note 7.
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the view which takes this distinction very seriously and which Dworkin has always challenged—legal
positivism.

B. Two Kinds of Legal Positivism
When talking about law in the abstract legal philosophers talk about three different things and often
without clearly distinguishing among them: the validity of legal norms, the normativity of law, and the
content of legal norms. A legal norm is said to be valid if and only if it is a member of a class of norms
that can be identified (in some yet unspecified way) as belonging to a certain legal system. The validity
of a legal norm, in other words, is the “mark” that distinguishes it from other norms, that explains why
it is a legal norm (as opposed to a social or moral norm). The content of a legal norm is what that norm
requires us to do (e.g., pay a certain tax), what it prohibits us from doing (e.g., take someone else’s
property without their consent), what powers it gives us (e.g., to make wills or contracts), or which
immunities it grants us (e.g., a right against invasion of our privacy). In all cases, we can draw some
kind of link between a certain set of facts that have to obtain (signing certain documents, earning certain
amount of money) and a certain legal outcome (the creation of certain contractual rights and duties; the
duty to pay a certain amount of tax). The normativity of a legal norm is the sense in which the legal
responses just mentioned are in some sense “non-optional,”14 the way in which legal norms create (or
purport to create) obligations that people take or refrain from taking certain actions.15
Clarifying these concepts is important, because disagreements among legal philosophers are often
best understood as resulting from different views on the relationship between these three concepts. At
first this suggestion may sound strange: the debate between legal positivism and natural law is usually
said to be about the relationship between law and morality, with legal positivism taken to be the thesis
that there is no necessary connection between the two, and natural law (and Dworkin) taking the
opposite view.16 But I believe this is a crude way of characterizing the difference between legal

14

HART, supra note 8, at 6. This definition fits criminal law prescriptions particularly well, but it is true of other norms

as well. Contract law is non-optional in the sense that it defines a set of conditions under which one may use certain
recognized legal mechanisms in order to create non-optional contractual rights and duties. Cf. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and
Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1941). Saying more about normativity beyond that would put me in controversial waters
that I do not wish to enter here.
15

For more on the distinction between validity, content, and normativity, see Danny Priel, Trouble for Legal Positivism?,

12 LEGAL THEORY 225, 232-36 (2006).
16

For positivist claiming no necessary connection between the two see KRAMER, supra note 13, at 1, passim; Jules L.

Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 241, 241 (Dennis
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positivists and Dworkin. What really is at stake between positivists and Dworkin is the relationship
between validity, normativity, and content. The difference of opinion on this issue is more fundamental
because it is of greater explanatory power: once these concepts and their relationships are understood,
we can understand why Dworkin and his positivist adversaries’ views differ on the relationship between
law and morality, as well as on many other questions. I believe their differences on such diverse
questions as whether the law contains something like a rule of recognition, whether the law contains
principles which are logically distinct from rules, whether there is one right answer to virtually all legal
questions, whether knowing the content of law involves moral considerations, what kind of relationship
is there between theory of law and theory of adjudication, and as we shall see even the question why
Dworkin thinks that the question “what is law?” is a brief way of asking “what count as good reasons for
a judicial decision?,” ultimately derive from different views about the relationship between validity,
normativity, and content.
Positivists disagree among themselves on many questions. As a first cut, however, we can say that
what unites all of them and distinguishes their account from Dworkin’s is that they treat the question of
validity as prior to and distinct from the question of content; and some positivists believe that these two
concepts are also separate from the question of normativity. For Dworkin, as we shall see, the three
questions are inseparable, and validity, if it plays any role in his account at all, is the least important of
the three. Initially the positivist view that all three concepts are independent of each other seems quite
plausible: to know how to decide a case we need first to identify the legal norm that governs the case;
and to know that we need to know how to identify legal norms in general. And the answer positivists
give to this question seems natural and appealing: identifying valid legal norms requires identifying a
certain procedure by which legal norms are promulgated, not looking into the norm’s content. After all,
there are many very different legal norms with very different content, but what is common to all of
them, what makes them legal norms, is that they came in a particular manner by which they can be
identified. Thus, the “nature” of law on this picture is that norms come into being if they adhere to a

Patterson ed., 1996) (“All legal positivists [believe] … that there is no necessary connection between law and morality”). In
contrast Dworkin has accepted the natural law position that such a connection does exist. See Ronald A. [sic] Dworkin,
“Natural” Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 165 (1982). That this is not what stands between the two camps can perhaps
be attested by the fact that recently several positivists have argued that there are necessary connections between law and
morality. See, e.g., John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 222-25 (2001) (calling this a “myth”);
Leslie
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certain formal test by which we can distinguish legal norms from other things in the world. Following
Hart, the name commonly used for this formal test is “rule of recognition.”
This is the positivist argument for separating a legal norm’s validity from its content. Many
positivists have also argued that we can understand in what way a legal norm is binding (“non-optional”)
independently of its content: it is not what the law requires that makes it binding; rather it is the fact
that it is the law that that makes it binding.17 Taken together these arguments explain why at least some
positivists consider all three concepts to be independent of each other, and why validity is the most
fundamental concept in identifying law: to know what the law requires and how it is binding on us, we
must first identify legal norms.
The problem with this suggestion is that it is ambiguous. To see the difference between the two
claims they make think of legal norms as closed boxes. The content of the norm, that is, what the norm
requires, is found inside the box. What the legal positivist argues is that there is a mark outside these
boxes by which we can identify them as legal norms without having to look inside the box to examine
their content. Now there are two ways of understanding the positivist claim: according to the first, the
mark identifies those things that are legal norms, but it cannot identify which norm is applicable to
which case, since this is already a question of the norm’s content, and that is something that identifying
the mark of legal norms cannot tell us. Thus, an English judge could know that in general things that
have been enacted by the Queen in Parliament are laws,18 so she could identify some things as law, but
this would not tell her what the law requires on any particular question. The second interpretation of
the positivist claim is that we can identify individual legal norms and so what they require. What it
cannot tell us is to which particular cases it applies; or perhaps it can tell us that too, but not whether it
will be “controlling” in that case or whether it could be defeated by other norms.
Different positivists, sometimes even the same theorist in different places, seem to vacillate
between these two theses. At times we are told that legal positivism is a thesis for the identification of
the “nature of law,” i.e. what distinguishes the set of all valid laws from other things in the world.
According to this view the “rule of recognition” can only identify those marks that distinguish all laws
from everything else.19 But at other times positivists argue for something much stronger, namely that
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See H.L.A. Hart, Legal and Moral Obligation, in ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 82, 84 (A.I. Melden ed., 1958) (arguing

that legal rules create content-independent obligation).
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HART, supra note 8, at 102.
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Id. at 6-10; Joseph Raz, Dworkin: A New Link in the Chain, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1107 (1986) (reviewing RONALD

DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985)) [hereinafter Raz, Dworkin] (“All [the rule of recognition] does, and all it is meant
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with the rule of recognition we can “identify[] [the] primary rules of obligation” in a particular
jurisdiction.20
Let me begin with the second interpretation. The problem with it is that it is hard to see how a
formal test like the rule of recognition could identify individual legal norms. At times it seems that this
point has just not been noticed, although it is hard to see how the identification of what makes
something belong to the set of legal norms can tell us anything about what individual norms require and
thus how one should behave in individual cases. No single formal test like the rule of recognition (even
if a highly complex one) could alone tell us how to identify the individual cases to which particular legal
norms apply: for this we must add an account that explains how to move from the identification of
something as belonging to the group of legal norms to knowing the content of individual legal norms.21
The only attempt I am familiar with to answer this challenge is the claim that once we have a test
for recognizing what separates law from non-law, and then “the law can be simply understood and
applied straightforwardly,”22 according to the “literal”23 meaning of its words. That is to say, according
to this view the rule of recognition allows us to identify individual legal norms, and once we have
identified them we can immediately know the content of individual legal norms. But this view is
mistaken, because this “literal” meaning is either a tautological reference to whatever is accepted as the
to do, is to identify which acts are acts of legislation and which are the rendering of binding judicial decisions, or more
generally, which acts create law.”); Joseph Raz, On the Nature of Law, 82 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 1, 3-5
(1996); see also note 26, infra.
20

HART, supra note 8, at 100. Contrast this view with Hart’s much weaker claim that all the rule of recognition

“identify[ies is] the authoritative sources of law.” HART, supra note 8, at 266 (emphasis added). Andrei Marmor is probably
most extreme when he suggests that positivism aims to explain what makes “statements of the form—‘According to the law
in ___ X has a right/duty/etc. to ___.’” ANDREI MARMOR, POSITIVE LAW AND OBJECTIVE VALUE 135 (2001). Marmor seems
to suggest here that the formal test of the rule of recognition can identify conclusive legal propositions.
21

See Priel, supra note 15, especially at 236-43. Some legal positivists, so-called “inclusive” positivists, allow some

content-based (and not merely formal) considerations to be part of the rule of recognition. See generally COLEMAN, supra note
13, at 103-48 (2001); MATTHEW H. KRAMER, WHERE LAW AND MORALITY MEET 17-140 (2004); WALUCHOW, supra note 12,
at 80-141 (1994). However, this does not solve the problem identified in the text, because their argument is that the tests for
identifying valid legal norms can include substantive constraints (for instance, that a putative immoral norm cannot be a legal
norm). But this presupposes that there is a prior and non-content based method for individuating legal norms and telling its
content, which their theory does not supply. Even those (like Coleman) who believe that certain norms can become legal
purely in virtue of their content have to explain how we are to know which of the myriad of possible content-based norms out
there are legal and which are not.
22

MARMOR, supra note 8, at 95.

23

Id. at 104.
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right interpretation of what the law requires in particular cases, or a false claim that in all times and
places what the law requires is determined by a single test. Understood this way legal positivism suffers
from a fundamental error: it presents itself as an account for identifying what the law requires, but it
does so only by falsely assuming that once one knows the features that identify valid legal norms in
general one can also know the content of each one of them.24
This suggests we should look instead at the first interpretation of the positivist project. According
to this view the positivist account was never intended to give judges a procedure for deciding cases,25 in
fact not even an account on how to identify legal norms. The role of the rule of recognition is not to be
used as a guide of individual legal norms. It only plays a role in an account of the “law-making
properties.” Whatever else one may say about a legal system it must have a rule of recognition, and
however we determine the content of its norms, it is because the rule of recognition provides us with
some guidance on how to do this.
The legal positivist on this account is a bit like a natural scientist: there are, no doubt, many
contingent facts about law, many differences between laws in different times and places, but underneath
all of them there are (or at least there may be) some properties in virtue of which some things in the
world are laws, and the positivist aims to give an account of those properties.26 Notice that on this
version of legal positivism what drives the legal positivist’s distinction between law and morality is not

24

On this reading of legal positivism its problem is more fundamental than the problem Dworkin believed undermines

it. Dworkin’s challenge to legal positivism, what he called the “semantic sting,” is roughly that legal positivism cannot explain
the existence of prevalent disagreements among lawyers on fundamental and central questions. But we now see that the
problem is not so much the existence of fundamental disagreements among lawyers (something that many positivists have
argued they can explain), but rather how to identify the content of legal norms in the first place. Even if there had been no
disagreements among lawyers at all, this version of positivism provides a false account on how to identify what the law
requires.
25

See HART, supra note 8, at 240; H.L.A. Hart, Comment, in ISSUES, supra note 10, at 35, 36 (“there is a standing need

for a form of legal theory … the perspective of which is not … what the law requires in particular cases.”).
26

Over the past three decades this view has been most eloquently defended by Joseph Raz. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Can

There Be a Theory of Law?, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 324, 328 (Martin P.
Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005) (“only necessary truths about the law reveal the nature of law”); JOSEPH RAZ,
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 104 (1979) [hereinafter RAZ, AUTHORITY] (“Since a legal theory
must be true of all legal systems … the identifying features … [of law] it characterizes … must of necessity be very general
and abstract. … It must fasten only on those features of legal systems which they must possess regardless of the special
circumstances of the societies in which they are in force. This is the difference between legal philosophy and sociology of
law.”).
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so much a substantive claim about the separation between law and morality, but rather a methodological
one: if one wishes to understand a certain phenomenon, the first step is to see the ways in which it is
different from similar things.27
Dworkin has serious doubts that this project is tenable (pp. 215-16), and I share this view,
although for somewhat different reasons.28 These arguments are not directly related to our concerns, so
I will not discuss them here. But even if they can be adequately answered, on this interpretation legal
positivism turns out to be not false but seriously incomplete: this version of legal positivism is a theory
of law that does not give us any clue as to how to move from identifying the group of things that are
laws to knowing the content of individual norms. In other words it is a theory of law, that by its
proponents’ own admission is silent on the question of identifying what most of those who come in
contact with the law care most about, what it requires of them.29

C. The Relationship Between Content and Normativity
Whatever are the merits of this kind of legal positivism, clarifying what positivism was about suggests
something interesting, namely that the gap between the question “what is law?” and the questions
Dworkin is interested in, “what is the law?” or “how should judges decide cases?,” may not be as wide as
it seemed at first. These questions are separate only if we are interested in distinguishing those things
that are laws from all other things in the world. But this is not at all Dworkin’s concern. If we are
interested in identifying individual legal norms, then there may be no basis for the accusation: “Law” in
this sense is just the aggregate of “the laws” of particular cases (cf. p. 221). There may simply be nothing
beyond that for us to look for. And since judges are required to decide cases by following “the law,” to
identify what the law requires is also to identify how judges should decide cases.
27
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This point undermines the distinction between legal validity and the content of legal norms, but it
still does not tell us how judges should identify what the law requires. This is where the third concept
mentioned earlier—that of normativity—comes in. Again, it will be useful to contrast Dworkin’s
position with that of the positivists. The statement “you have a moral obligation not to kill others,” is
true, if it is true, in virtue of its content, and not in virtue of some mark of validity. Likewise, what makes
a particular moral norm binding, i.e. what explains its normativity, is its content, not the fact that it was
said by someone or was promulgated by some recognized procedure. As we have already seen, some
positivists argue that one of the differences between law and morality is that unlike the case of morality,
law’s normativity does not depend on the content of its norms. Hart offered an early defense of this
view when he tried to show that what makes legal norms binding was the fact that they were part of a
certain social practice, and not because what they required was necessarily morally good.30 More recent
versions of the same approach tried to explain law’s normativity by developing the idea that law is a
convention or a shared co-operative activity.31
But Dworkin objects to this too. Dworkin’s defense of law’s normativity goes all the way to law’s
content. In an earlier book he wrote that “[j]urisprudence is the general part of adjudication, a silent
prologue to any decision at law.”32 This passage puzzled—and was vigorously contested by—many a
reader of Dworkin.33 It is usually interpreted by critics to suggest that in order “to know the law
governing each case one must be making, explicitly or implicitly, assumptions about the nature of
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law.”34 But this, I believe, is a misunderstanding of Dworkin’s point. Properly understood this passage
fits Dworkin’s general account very well and is in fact quite plausible. What Dworkin says here is that
for law to create obligations it has to be legitimate; otherwise it only creates what has the appearance of
obligation, but is in fact merely a demand backed by the threat of punishment. But since we believe that
law is capable of being legitimate (and only when it is legitimate it creates obligations), then just like in
the case of morality, we must look at law’s content in order to know whether it creates genuine
obligations. If, for instance, the law of a state is illegitimate its demands for one’s tax money are no
more legitimate (and thus no more capable of creating obligations) than those of the robber who
demands one’s wallet. (It was after all Hart, the positivist, who insisted that law is not the gunman
situation writ large.35) To be sure, the way the money is demanded and the identity of the person (or
body) who makes the demand may affect the determination whether the demand is legitimate: a just
demand for my tax money may not be legitimate if made by a government that got to power by force.
Nevertheless, one crucial factor in determining whether the demand is legitimate is what is being
demanded. From the other direction, we rely on the fact that law is capable of creating obligations to
determine what the law requires. In this bidirectional way we link between what the law requires (its
content) and what it means for law to make a requirement (its normativity).
Interpreted this way Dworkin’s account appears to be quite robust. There are six features of it that
are worth emphasizing: First, to some degree the question of legitimacy depends on the question of the
identification of law, or, to use the language used before, the validity, content, and normativity of law
are closely tied. Second, Dworkin’s account explains his claim that jurisprudence is a branch of political
morality (p. 241), for answering the question “what is (the) law?” turns, at least in part, on the question
whether the law is legitimate, and this requires us to consider questions of political morality. Third, it
explains why the question of legitimacy (and therefore the question of law’s normativity) is asked at the
level of individual norms and not at the level of legal systems: even though we could make some general
claims on the matter, in the end whether some demand creates an obligation one should follow has to
be answered on a case by case basis, based on the content of the demand. This is the sense in which
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jurisprudence and political philosophy are presupposed by every legal decision.36 Fourth, because the
question of legitimacy can be raised with regard to every legal norm, we can understand Dworkin’s
otherwise surprising claim that his theory of law “is equally at work in easy cases [as in hard cases], but
since the answers to the questions it puts are … obvious [with regard to easy cases], or at least seem to
be so, we are not aware that any theory is at work at all.”37 There are at least seven ways of drawing the
line between easy and hard cases: as a distinction between cases involving simple facts and cases
involving highly complex facts; between simple legal issues (parking in a no-parking area) and highly
complex law (complex tax rules); between matters governed by law and matters on which there is a
lacuna in the law; between cases in which there seems to be only one applicable legal norm and cases
which seem to be governed by several, conflicting legal norms; between cases in which judges have
little or no discretion and cases in which they are given wide discretion; between cases in which the law
conforms with morality and cases in which what the law requires seems to be in conflict with our moral
intuitions; and finally between cases that are socially uncontroversial and cases dealing with matters on
which society is divided. But whichever way this distinction is drawn, understood as a question of
normativity and legitimacy, Dworkin’s claim makes sense: the need to legitimate the use of force is
equally pressing and goes “all the way down” in easy cases as in hard cases. Fifth, the particular decisions
implicate our more general commitments as to what could count as obligation-creating practices: if we
interpret a particular instance as one of obligation-creating law (as opposed to a mere demand backed
by threat), then this has to figure in as part of a larger picture of what could count as law more
generally. This way, again, the decision at the particular level cannot be separated from the more
abstract and general level. Finally, this account explains why, if we are interested in the legitimacy of
the use of force by the state, the fact that there exists a practice of paying attention to, say, certain
pronouncements that come out of Congress, does not suffice. Rather, it is only because we can provide
some normative account that justifies paying attention to those pronouncements we call statutes, that
explains why they are laws.
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It would be a mistake, however, to think at this point that any of this implies that judges should
consider questions of political morality in their judgments. Even if we accept everything in this
reconstruction of Dworkin’s argument we may still conclude that courts can be legitimate only if judges
refrain as much as they can from relying on (overt) moral arguments. This conclusion in support of nonpolitical courts may itself be based on moral and political considerations such as separation of powers,
democracy, judicial competence and individual responsibility (cf. p. 174).38 This, however, is not
Dworkin’s view. He believes that what makes a judicial decision legitimate, and ultimately what justifies
the authority of law, is that it makes the correct moral demands; and since he also believes courts are
capable of finding what the morally right answer to political question is (perhaps even more so than
other branches of government), they ought to engage in moral deliberation. As this conclusion does not
follow from Dworkin’s argument as outlined until now, he needs to offer a separate argument for this
conclusion. He does. So the question to which we must turn now is what makes a judicial decision
legitimate.

III. CAN THE DWORKINIAN MODEL BE JUSTIFIED?
It stands to reason that in order for judicial decisions to be legitimate judges should follow the law. But
what exactly does it mean for judges to follow the law? How should judges approach their task of
following the law in order to render their decisions legitimate? Dworkin’s answer is that judges’
decisions are correct as a matter of law, and hence legitimate, if judges consciously try to determine the
moral rights and duties of the parties in question and use this data to interpret the relevant legal
materials. The argument essentially is that the state must treat those subject to its laws as bearers of
rights and most fundamentally the right to equal concern and respect. This demand applies to all
branches of government, but it is especially true of courts, because courts are “forums of principle,”39
that is, unlike other branches of government courts are places to which people come to claim what they
are entitled to according to pre-existing moral principle. As Dworkin put it already in his first academic

38

For moral arguments in support of exactly this view see TOM D. CAMPBELL, THE LEGAL THEORY

POSITIVISM 85-87 (1996); GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM

AND THE

OF

ETHICAL

COMMON LAW TRADITION 405-06, 425-26 (1986)

(discussing Bentham’s arguments). Similar arguments have also been invoked against judicial review. See, e.g., Jeremy
Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).
39

DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 69-70.

15

publication, those who come to court asking for redress, never come to court as supplicants hoping for
the court’s compassion or mercy, they come as litigants, demanding what’s theirs by right.40
Dworkin thus believes that what renders a judicial decision correct is that it complies with the way
morality requires we treat the person in question. But this requirement could clash with another
strongly held demand, namely that the law be public and impartial and that those who administer it will
not rely on their personal views in applying and enforcing it. An explicit call for judges to rely on moral
considerations may result in biased decisions based on different judges’ personal views on what’s moral,
even if the judges make a conscientious effort not to do that. And it goes without saying that this hardly
seems like a recipe for legitimate court decisions.
Dworkin of course recognizes that there may be an occasional judge who abuses her job, or even a
corrupt legal system in which the judiciary as a whole routinely and pervasively does so, but this does
not undermine his belief in his model according to which judges can discover the objective content of
morality. And he believes that despite acknowledging great controversies about what morality requires
in particular circumstances. Dworkin’s answer thus has two components. First, that a politically
involved judiciary can rely on moral values and still follow the law, and second, that judges should do so.
Dworkin does not distinguish between these two issues in this way in Justice in Robes, but his focus in the
book is more on the first question than on the second. I will therefore follow him and dedicate most of
my discussion, in Sections III.A and III.B, to this question. Section III.C will raise some doubts
regarding Dworkin’s answer to the second question.

A. Right Answers Out of Disagreement
Dworkin’s argument rests on the assumption that there are objective moral values on which judges
should anchor their decisions in their attempt to reach the right, legitimate, decisions. But a relativist
can challenge this view in at least two different ways. First, she will say, each society, perhaps even each
person, has a different set of moral values which cannot be judged as correct or incorrect by the moral
standards adopted by others. The second challenge is epistemic: according to this argument even if in
some sense there is a right answer to moral questions, given the pervasive and seemingly irresolvable
societal disagreements on such matters, we cannot know what the right answer is. When those
questions are raised in the political domain, the best decision procedure we have is to follow a
majoritarian rule. Giving courts the power to rule on such matters is inconsistent with this decision
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procedure, because judges are unelected, unaccountable, and sometimes rule against unambiguous
popular majorities.
For someone who believes that the legitimacy of judicial decisions depends on their moral
correctness such challenges are crucial to answer, and it is no wonder that Dworkin indeed dedicates so
much space to defending the objectivity of morality, not so much for its own sake, but as part of his
argument about how judges should decide cases. In Justice in Robes Dworkin does not discuss the
challenge from democracy, although he did so in other writings. There he argued that in cases in which
the law represents a societal choice, courts should follow that choice only if such choice does not flout
fundamental rights. When fundamental rights are infringed, judges should ignore majoritarian
preferences and rely on the “trumping” power of rights over majorities.41 But this answer presupposes
that there is a satisfactory answer to the first challenge, i.e. that despite the controversy about moral
values, they have objective content which judges can find and rely on in their judgments. Though not
stated in quite this way, this is, I believe, the place of Dworkin’s arguments in favor of moral objectivity
within the larger structure of his overall account: explaining why morality is objective is a crucial aspect
of his theory explaining why courts may be legitimate, and why on matters of rights and duties judges
need not care much about what the majority thinks. For Dworkin to explain the objectivity of morality
is ultimately to explain the legitimacy of courts and in this way answer the question “what is law?”
But do Dworkin’s argument for the objectivity of morality despite pervasive disagreement hold
up?

B. Interpretive Concepts and Objectivity
(1) What Are Interpretive Concepts?
Dworkin does not aim to give a psychological, logical, or historical account of the fact of pervasive
disagreement about values. He takes it for granted that such disagreements exist (pp. 77-78). He argues
that these disagreements do not undermine his claim that moral propositions have determinate answer,
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and he elaborates a method he believes would lead judges (and others) to reach the correct answer to
legal disputes.
The key to Dworkin’s solution is what he calls “interpretive concepts,” a notion he introduced in
Law’s Empire42 and that has been central to his thinking ever since. In Justice in Robes Dworkin begins by
contrasting interpretive concepts with criterial concepts and natural kind concepts: criterial concepts
such as book are concepts whose extension is fixed by a set of necessary and sufficient criteria (pp. 9-10).
Two people share a criterial concept only when they (at least roughly) share the criteria for their
application. Natural kind concepts such as water are concepts whose extension is fixed by what certain
things in the world turn out to be (even if this conflicts with societal attitudes on the matter), and
therefore on whose content we defer to experts (p. 10). Two people share a natural kind concept if
they are talking about the same substance, even if their beliefs on that substance are different and even if
their beliefs on that substance are largely false.
Why does Dworkin think that we need another kind of concept to explain moral and legal
discourse? It makes no sense, says Dworkin, to think of political concepts as natural kind concepts,
because, as he is fond of saying, they have no DNA (pp. 3, 113, 152, 215). But in that case why not say
that moral concepts are criterial? According to this view there are certain criteria that fix the meaning
of, say, justice, and if there are disagreements between people about what constitutes justice it simply
shows that though they use the same word, they in fact have different concepts of justice. Dworkin
rejects this answer, because he believes it leads to absurd conclusions. He thinks that only if we share a
concept we can make sense of disagreement. If, to take the well-worn example, I talk about “bank”
thinking about the edge of a river and you talk about “bank” thinking of a financial institution, and we
disagree over the question whether banks are often damp, then our disagreement is not real, because we
are not talking about the same thing.43 But since “lawyers obviously do genuinely disagree about the
content of the law of their jurisdiction” (p. 221, emphasis added), we must have a different explanation
for disagreement in law. Interpretive concepts are supposed to provide the solution, for they are
supposed to explain the possibility of concepts that have no DNA but have objective content despite the
existence of persistent disagreement over their content. Thus interpretive concepts play a crucial role in
Dworkin’s overall account, because only if such concepts exist can there be objective right answers to
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the question what the law requires, which as we have seen, is an essential step for establishing the
legitimacy of the demands courts make.
But in what sense can we say that two people that have radically different beliefs as to what justice
demands share the concept of justice? Just inventing a new kind of concept and saying that people can
share it despite substantial disagreement would be special pleading. We need a plausible account of
what such concepts are. Oddly, despite the centrality of interpretive concepts to his overall argument,
until Justice in Robes Dworkin never gave a clear definition of what he had meant when he first
introduced these concepts. In Justice in Robes he tries to remedy this by giving the following explanation:
Some of our concepts function differently …: they function as interpretive concepts that encourage us to reflect on
and contest what some practice we have constructed requires. People in the boxing world share the concept of
winning a round even though they often disagree about who has won a particular round and about what
concrete criteria should be used in deciding that question. Each of them understands that the answer to these
questions turn on the best interpretation of the rules, conventions, expectations, and other phenomena of
boxing and of how all these are best brought to bear in making that decision on a particular occasion. …
Interpretive concepts … require that people share a practice: they must converge in actually treating the
concept as interpretive. But that does not mean converging in the application of the concept. People can share
such a concept even when they dramatically about its instances. So a useful theory of interpretive concept—a
theory of justice or of winning a round—cannot simply report the criteria people use to identify instances or
simply excavate the deep structure of what people mainly agree are instances. A useful theory of an interpretive
concept must itself be an interpretation, which is very likely to be controversial, of the practice in which the
concept figures. [Pp. 10-12, emphases added.]

Dworkin does not demand much. As he says in a different place, people “share the concept
[justice] because they participate in a social practice of judging acts and institutions just and unjust and
because each has opinions, articulate or inarticulate, about what the right way to continue the practice
on particular occasions: the right judgments to make and the right behavior in response to those
judgments” (p. 224).44 Dworkin concedes that we can rule out some claims about interpretive concepts
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on semantic grounds alone, for instance the claim that “seven is the most unjust of the prime numbers”
(p. 151), but he maintains that all the interesting debates, all the debates that political philosophers and
lawyers seriously engage in, are not of this sort.
To understand Dworkin’s idea we need first to distinguish between two senses in which the word
“concept” is used. It is used, especially in the literature of philosophy of mind, to refer to the basic
constituent element of thought of a person.45 Call these I-concepts (“I” for internal). There are moments
that Dworkin seems to adopt this sense of the word, for example when he writes that people “must
converge in actually treating the concept as interpretive” (p. 11, emphases added) in order for it to be
interpretive. But concepts in this sense do not “encourage us to reflect” (p. 10, see also p. 224) on
them. They are merely elements of thought. So it makes more sense to say that Dworkin uses concepts
in another sense, as something like “Idea,” that is, as a kind of abstract formulation of the fundamental
features of an object. Call these E-concepts (“E” for external), because these concepts do not necessarily
represent the mental content of any particular person. It is evident that Dworkin has this sense in mind
when he talks about the way such concepts “function” by encouraging people to think about certain
practices. It is in this sense in mind that he says (in what seems like a contradiction with his words just
quoted) that “[i]t is hardly a decisive objection that very few people would identify their own practice
[of law] in that way [i.e., as an interpretive concept]: we are engaged in philosophical explanation, not
vicarious semantic introspection” (p. 12, emphasis added). Certain concepts are interpretive concepts
even if (some) people don’t treat them as such.
Even with these clarifications Dworkin’s idea is still quite vague. So I offer now a set of seven
features which together capture what Dworkin means by interpretive concepts:
Why does this matter? It matters because the concept of essentially contested concepts is itself contested, or at least
quite murky. On the one hand it seems that Dworkin would accept MacIntyre’s take on the concept of essentially contested
concepts. MacIntyre said that when dealing with social practices such as “politics, education, or science[, d]ebate within such a
practice is inseparable from debate about the practice, and both form parts of each practice.” Alasdair MacIntyre, The Essential
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(a) They are (E-)concepts that refer to social practices.
(b) People share these concepts when they agree, roughly, about the importance of those concepts (p. 148), as
well as about manifestations of the practice (e.g., the workings of courts are a manifestation of the
interpretive concept law).
(c) Yet people who share these concepts disagree about the “best interpretation” of the practice, and
consequently how the practice should be manifested in particular instances. Thus, when explaining the
notion of interpretive value he says that for it to be interpretive “those who accept it as a value must …
disagree about precisely what value it is” (p. 169, emphasis added).
(d) These disagreements are “interpretive,” not “conceptual,” meaning that they are evaluative all the way
down. In other words, there is no way of distinguishing between what the practice is in the abstract and
how it requires us to behave in particular circumstances (pp. 154-55). Hence, we cannot give a “neutral”
definition of what counts as law or justice. All such accounts will presuppose some, possibly unstated,
normative assumptions. That’s why all contesting accounts are “interpretations” of the practice, all aiming
to show it in its best light.
(e) There is no known way of resolving disagreements about what counts as the practice or for proving the
correctness of one interpretation of the practice. Dworkin rejects the view that in ethics or law “nothing
can count as a good argument … unless it is demonstrably persuasive, that is, unless no one who is rational
can or will resist it” (p. 267 n.14). He argues that it is wrong to “import[] standards of good argument that
are foreign to a practice into it from some external level of skepticism” (id.).46 As a result, the
disagreements are persistent: “We argue for our constitutional interpretations, knowing that others will
inevitably reject our arguments, and that we cannot appeal to shared principles of either political morality or
constitutional method to demonstrate that we are right” (p. 127, emphases added).
(f) Nonetheless, there are objective right answers to such disagreements, and these are answers that are not
determined by (although they may be partly dependent upon) existing opinion as to what counts as the
best interpretation of the practice.
(g) Relatedly, an interpretation of the practice is always open for revision. Even if there is universal agreement
on an interpretation of the practice, the agreement does not render the interpretation true, or make
contesting it otiose. For instance, even if everyone were to believed that there is nothing wrong with
slavery, that would not change the fact that slavery is wrong (p. 60).

This, I believe, is a clearer explication of the notion of interpretive concepts than anything
Dworkin has ever provided. But it does not yet answer the question whether there are any interpretive
concepts.
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(2) Are There Any Interpretive Concepts?
What reasons does Dworkin supply for thinking that the seven features enumerated above
correctly describe political, moral, and legal concepts? Dworkin’s relies on two observations: one, that
the content of political concepts is never exhausted by the discourse about those concepts; the other,
that disagreements about political concepts cannot be resolved. Let us consider these claims and their
implications.
If I point at a table and say “this is a sofa” I make an error, and if my error is not just the result of
thoughtlessness or poor command of the English language, it is because I am mistaken about the content
of the E-concept of sofa. What fixes the objective content of the concept is an implicitly accepted set of
criteria by a community, i.e. it is the existence of some kind of societal (conventional) agreement “on
semantic grounds” (p. 151) about the matter. If I employ the concept sofa differently, I am wrong. But
an entire community cannot be wrong about sofas: the communal sense of what sofas are is fixed by
what people believe sofas are.47 In contrast, in the case of interpretive concepts Dworkin believes it is
always open for people to question the content of such concepts, and they can always offer novel
“interpretations” of them that show these concepts in their “best light.” Thus what counts as the right
answer to the question “what is the content of the concept of justice?” is never fully determined by
people’s attitudes on the concept.
But at the same time Dworkin does not want to reach the conclusion that there is something
outside our lives that fixes the content of moral concepts in the same way that the chemical structure of
water fixes what water is. If that were the case we could describe moral concepts without being
engaged in moral argument; we would simply be describing the features of such concepts in the same
way that we describe the features of natural kind concepts like water. But Dworkin vigorously rejects
this view, which he calls Archimedeanism (pp. 142-43). Archimedeanism presupposes two levels of
moral discourse, one “internal” to morality about what one should do, and another “external” about
what moral concepts mean. Dworkin’s response is that “the external level that [Archimedeans] hope[] to
occupy does not exist” (pp. 38-39).48 So Dworkin must carve a space for a kind of concept whose
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referent is in some sense created by us (unlike discourse on the natural kind concept water), but whose
content is nevertheless never exhausted by our attitudes, because disagreement over the application of
the concept, and even challenges to universally accepted views, are possible even against a background
of conventional agreement (unlike the discourse on the criterial concept sofa).
Let us begin by considering the case of sofas: we can imagine someone arguing that we have all
been wrong in our understanding of what sofas are, and that in fact they are objects of ritual.49 We
would, no doubt, initially tell such a person that he simply does not know what a sofa is. But with
enough persuasive power and some evidence we might come to appreciate his claims. If that is true,
then the only difference between the concept of equality and the concept of sofa is that in the former
debate about what the concept refer to is real in the case of equality and merely hypothetical in the case

(1) Against the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics and between conceptual and normative
discussions of political concepts (pp. 108-10).
(2) More generally, against the distinction between claims within a practice and claims about claims within a practice.
This is his claim against philosophers who “distinguish the first-order discourse of the practice [those theorists] study… from
their own second-order platform or ‘meta’ discourse, in which first-order concepts are defined and explored” (p. 141).
(3) Against a distinction of principle between general jurisprudence and doctrinal analysis of particular cases (see text
accompanying note 32, supra).
(4) Against the possibility of making non-perspectival statements (pp. 37-38).
Theorists of entirely different philosophical persuasions who have offered utterly different arguments defending these
different views are thus all found to be guilty of Archimedeanism. It is unlikely that all four versions of Dworkin’s antiArchimedeanism are true (partly because in attacking (1) and (2) Dworkin comes extremely close to endorsing something like
(4)), but even if they are, Dworkin needs four different arguments to show that. Dworkin might contend (using some metaanti-Archimedean argument, perhaps) that despite appearances all these arguments are actually the same, but he has not done
that.
I should note that though I will discuss some aspects of Dworkin’s anti-Archimedeanism that are pertinent for
understanding his theory of law, my comments are by no means exhaustive of what I believe to be the problems with it. For
this one should start with Dworkin’s fullest anti-Archimedean manifesto, not reprinted in Justice in Robes, namely Ronald
Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 89 (1996). For criticism see Allan, supra note 3;
Brian Leiter, Objectivity, Morality, and Adjudication, in OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS 66 (Brian Leiter ed., 2001); see also
SIMON BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASONING 296-97 (1998).
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of sofas. Can this be the basis for the distinction between criterial and interpretive concepts? This
solution seems unappealing, because it suggests that if a vigorous debate were to emerge about sofas,
this would change the concept sofa from a criterial to an interpretive one. More seriously it would
suggest that what distinguishes between criterial and interpretive concepts is nothing more than the
contingent fact about the existence of debate on its criteria. If that is all, then it would turn out that
Dworkin’s claims about the need for a new kind of concept to accommodate social practices were
exaggerated.
But this seems to be exactly Dworkin’s view. Tucked away in one of the endnotes we find
Dworkin’s offhand remark that “[p]erhaps some or all interpretive concepts began their conceptual lives
as criterial.” He also adds “for example” that “[a]n imprecise criterial concept becomes interpretive when
it is embedded in a rule or direction or principle on whose correct interpretation something important
turns” (p. 264, n.7, emphasis added).50 Notice how Dworkin smuggles in the notion of “correct”
interpretation, but whether such a “correct” interpretation (one that transcends the shared criteria of a
particular linguistic community) exists is exactly the question at stake, and the account he gives leaves
open less extravagant explanations, that do not demand the invention of new concepts. Indeed, now it
seems that even by Dworkin’s lights interpretive concepts are either concepts about which it is
implicitly accepted that their criteria of application are open for challenge, or alternatively that the
disagreement emerges because different people use the same word while employing different (criterial)
concepts. Both these possibilities explain how a criterial concept could become interpretive, but both
explanations do so by making the notion of interpretive concepts explanatorily redundant. Moreover,
because Dworkin says nothing about the “mechanics” of transformation from criterial to interpretive
concept, this “historical” account of the emergence of interpretive concepts leaves it utterly mysterious
how, once criterial concepts become interpretive, they acquire objective content that may be different
from what any user of them ever entertained.
Instead of answering such challenges what Dworkin does is block all evidence that could
undermine his account (e.g., that disagreement is the result of different people having conflicting
criterial concepts) as irrelevant. For instance, according to Dworkin anyone who tries to use empirical
findings about the moral views of different people at different times is making a fundamental error,
because all this evidence belongs to different intellectual “domains” like sociology or anthropology, and
as such has no bearing whatsoever on morality proper, which seeks to discover the true content of
50
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moral concepts (pp. 76-78). But this claim is problematic in several respects. First, Dworkin simply
asserts this view, without explaining on what basis he makes it. Second, this assertion is
Archimedeanism par excellence. This claim by itself is not part of moral discourse but a claim about moral
discourse, or more precisely, about what could belong to moral discourse. Third, Dworkin provides no
standard for deciding which claims are internal moral claims and which are sociological observations
that are not part of the moral “domain.” In fact, he often relies on “sociological” observations about
moral discourse as if they are part of morality, or at least as supporting his view about the objectivity of
morality. For instance he has argued that “[p]eople who say that it is unjust to deny adequate medical
care to the poor do not think that they are just expressing an attitude or accepting a rule or standard as a
kind of personal commitment. They think they are calling attention to something that is already true
independently of anyone’s attitude, including theirs….”51 But this seems like a sociological fact, which
by Dworkin’s lights should be irrelevant for understanding the content of moral concepts. Why are such
empirical observations (for which, by the way, Dworkin offers no evidence) within the domain of
morality?
By not providing a standard for distinguishing what belongs to the domain of moral discourse,
Dworkin manages to immune his argument from criticism. Any suggestion that moral discourse might
be mistaken is either interpreted “internally” and as such can only serve as further proof that moral
discourse is interpretive, and (because of Dworkin’s definition of interpretive concepts) as further
support for the claim that the concept has objective content; or it is interpreted as belonging to a
different “domain” and as such as irrelevant to the debate about law’s objectivity!
Imagine a similar argument about a different question: theologians of different religions have been
arguing for centuries about the correct attributes of God. I believe not even the most devout would
argue from the existence of a debate about God’s attributes to the existence of God. To be sure, it may
show the existence of “God” within a certain discourse, but that God exists only within that discourse.
This, however, would be little consolation for the person who wants to know whether God exists, not
whether “God” exists.
This shows that something has gone wrong with Dworkin’s argument, and it also points to where
the error is: Dworkin recognizes this challenge and answers that unlike claims about God or astrology,
“morality and the other evaluative domains make no causal claims.”52 But if that is the case, how do we
get to know what morality requires? If we reject the possibility of some special moral faculty by which
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we get a sense of the moral as implausible, then we remain we the possibility that morality and its
requirements are what is accepted as part of some discourse. The implications of this view to Dworkin’s
position are devastating.
An example from a different domain will help us understand the issues. Consider the discourse
that exists among literary theorists of explaining Hamlet’s behavior. There exists a certain discourse and
there are certain rules on the question what counts as “valid moves” within the discourse. For instance,
the text of Hamlet is considered important for assessing Hamlet’s behavior whereas the text of volume 1
of the Harvard Law Review is not. Suppose now someone comes and claims that it makes no sense to
ascribe any beliefs, desires, or qualities to Hamlet, since he does not exist and never existed, and that
only real persons can have psychological attitudes. This skeptical “error theory” about Hamlet would
strikes us as odd; as a challenge that somehow misses the point of the debate for reasons very similar to
those Dworkin advances against the skeptical critic of the objectivity of morality: from within the
discourse that presupposes Hamlet’s existence (even if in a make-believe way) it literally makes no
sense to raise the skeptical claim that Hamlet does not exist. In contrast as an external claim made from
outside the discourse, this claim, though true, is irrelevant because the Hamlet discourse operates on a
“separate domain” from that of the real world.53 Crucially, however, in the same way that the “Hamlet
discourse” can disregard as irrelevant anything that happens outside its domain, other domains are
unaffected by what happens within that domain. This is in fact the exact mirror image of the
unintelligibility of the external skeptical claim from within the practice. And so any claim made within
the discourse will not be intelligible outside the discourse. If one fails to join in the “make-believe” game
of Hamlet’s existence, all ascriptions of attitude to him would be false. This means that the discourse
cannot “impose” itself on those who do not join it. Only once one joins a discourse, and only so long as
one remains within the discourse, one is bound by the normative limits it sets.
But in this way Dworkin, who professes to defend the common sense conception of morality, ends
up offering a conception of morality that is fundamentally different from it, a set of demands that one
53
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has to follow only if one “signs in” to them. Common sense morality claims universality that is not
grounded in the existence of a discourse, and it denies that morality is something we need to “sign in” to
or can “sign out” of. Moral discourse presents itself as making universal demands upon us, demands that
are not part of a “game.” Dworkin might try to present this claim itself as within the discourse itself, but
no matter how universally a discourse takes itself to be (or participants in the discourse believe it to be),
the discourse cannot have any normative force beyond its boundaries. Since the claims to the
universality of the discourse are themselves made within the discourse, they too are only intelligible
from within the discourse.
The analogy with the “Hamlet discourse” also helps us see why, contrary to Dworkin’s claims (p.
37), there is no inconsistency in making both internal claims within moral discourse and external, even
skeptical, claims about the practice from outside: there is no contradiction in making certain “internal”
claims about Hamlet’s character while recognizing that Hamlet does not exist and that therefore all
claims about him are in some sense false.
Thus, by insisting on the “independence” of moral concepts (pp. 76-78) Dworkin insulates his
argument from criticism, but he does so in a question-begging fashion, for it is exactly the independence
of moral discourse that his opponents challenge. It is exactly the claim of some moral anti-realists that
even though moral discourse is conducted as if morality is independent of other discourses, its claim to
independence can make sense only if certain, and highly implausible facts, are true.54 To answer by
saying that this claim is false because moral discourse is conducted independently of other discourses is
not to answer the challenge but to repeat the claim being challenged.
All this shows that Dworkin’s response has no force against the moral skeptic who claims that the
kind of claims that morality makes are false. At this point Dworkin may revise his response by saying
that though this imaginary objector is right, her claim is not interesting or important for real life debate:
we may have some academic interest in the moral nihilist, but she is not someone we encounter in real
life and her qualms are of little practical interest. Most professed moral skeptics live a moral life and
defend or criticize certain moral behaviors. Evidently then, in word and action they joined the moral
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discourse and therefore their external challenges are just as interesting as skeptical comments about
Hamlet’s real-life existence made in the course of a Shakespeare convention.55
But even this construal of Dworkin’s argument does not lead to the conclusion he seeks. Dworkin
relied on the fact of persistent disagreement about moral concepts to show that participants in the
discourse are trying to offer the best account they can of a single, shared, concept. But if Dworkin
endorses the fact that moral discourse is independent of other discourses and “answers” only to
arguments from within, he must allow for the possibility of several moral discourses, that are by-andlarge internally consistent but are, at least to some degree, incomprehensible to each other. That is one
possible way of introducing the evidence about different moral codes in different times and in different
parts of the world, evidence that Dworkin did not contest but dismissed as irrelevant. This is a possible
explanation for the existence of moral disagreement, and unlike Dworkin’s this explanation enjoys
much evidential support and does not require any of the heavy-duty philosophical argument that
involves the invention of new kinds of concepts that Dworkin advances in order to support his view. On
this account many of today’s moral clashes are the result of different moral traditions that developed
with relative independence and internal coherence from each other until disappearing geographical or
cultural barriers have brought them together, and quite often into clash. In fact, even within the
“Western” moral tradition we can trace two distinct and until recently quite separate moral discourses,
one, Judeo-Christian, mainly concerned with ideas of duty, action, and individual responsibility, and
more recently rights; and the other, Greco-Roman, which is founded on ideas of virtue, character,
nature, and community.56 Many modern moral conflicts can be traced back to these two conflicting
moral discourses.
How Dworkin would respond to this suggestion is not entirely clear. Sometimes he seems to hold
a view that accepts the conclusion that there may be more than one objective truth to a particular moral
or legal question. He says at one point that for a view to be objective all that is required is that it be
supported by “[s]ubstantive reasons” (p. 260): “If we think that our reasons for thinking [that the
manufacturers of a dangerous medicine are legally responsible for injuries in proportion to their market
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share], then we must also think that the proposition that the manufacturers are liable is objectively true”
(id.). So for our legal responses to be objectively true, all that we need is to think (confidently?) that our
reasons supporting those views are convincing. In the end what counts are “any lawyer’s or judge’s …
convictions of personal and political morality” (p. 32, emphasis added; cf. p. 42). But there are other
people who are equally confident that there are good reasons leading to the opposite conclusion, and as
Dworkin admits (in words that have been quoted earlier), he does not believe his arguments would
convince them. So we have two groups of people with strong convictions that their opposite
conclusions to legal questions are explained by good reasons, and thus both groups satisfy Dworkin’s
requirements for objective truth. Needless to say, if that is all that Dworkin means by objectivity, there
is little to object about it. But if that counts as objective truth, what by Dworkin’s lights could count as
a discourse on which there is no objective truth? More importantly, since this sense of objectivity could
legitimate every decision, it is hard to see how it could legitimate any decision.
At other times Dworkin seems to say something else. In answering the claim that moral values
conflict he says that anyone who wants to support this view must show “why the understanding of that
value that produces the conflict is the most appropriate one” (p. 116, emphasis added), and that we must
always try to articulate a “conception” (p. 114) of those values in which they do not conflict. Dworkin
thus criticizes those theorists who seem to believe they are merely describing a fact about morality when
they talk about value conflicts (pp. 109-10).57
Dworkin’s suggestion, if I understand him correctly, is that while it might be possible to interpret
the fact of disagreement as the result of several “internal” moral discourses, which may employ similar
words but give them very different meaning, this is not the best interpretation of the facts. Since
Dworkin believes that moral discourse is interpretive all the way down, he would contend that we
should strive for the best interpretation of morality, the interpretation that presents morality itself in the
best light. And the best interpretation of moral discourse is one that makes the debate among its
participants meaningful. But if participants in the debate are using the same word for different concepts,
then it would follow that they are wasting their time talking at cross-purposes. It therefore would
present the debate in better light if we treated the participants as engaged in a single moral discourse
which is independent from other domains and that disagreements in it have a single right answer.
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At first this seems a plausible suggestion, but it leads to a remarkable conclusion that the more
disagreement there is on the content of a certain concept, the more this suggests that the dispute has a
right answer, because interpreting it in this way presents it in better light. Furthermore, it suggests that
it does not matter what participants in the debate themselves think of their dispute. Even if they
themselves believe they are arguing over different yet inconsistent moral concepts (which, by the way,
need not necessarily render their debates pointless), if we the theorists believe it presents their debate
in better light, then we should interpret their debate differently from their understanding of it.
Suppose, however, we accepted the idea that we should try to interpret morality so as to show it
in its best light, is there any reason to think that Dworkin’s interpretation puts moral discourse in its
best light? Consistent with his anti-Archimedeanism Dworkin seems to suggest, that the no-conflict
conception of moral discourse is the most appropriate because it is morally superior. But such an
argument is circular, for the interpretation it advances of the practice is based on Dworkin’s own ideal
of what the practice should be like. As such it will leave cold anyone who has a different interpretation
of what would make for a superior practice. Take, for instance, Dworkin’s claim that moral
propositions are not demonstrable in the way that mathematical propositions are (p. 267 n.14). This
may be seen as an undesirable result of Dworkin’s own interpretation (or conception) of morality.
Someone who believes that the morally best conception of morality is one that would make morality as
demonstrable as possible would be led to a conception of morality very different from Dworkin’s. The
problem is that since both interpretations would support themselves by their own understanding of
what is morally superior (or what would make moral discourse appear in better light), neither will be
able to undermine the other. Similarly, someone who argues that the morally best conception of
morality is one in which some moral conflicts exist (because, for example, such a conception respects the
people who have, or had, those moral views and their traditions) would not be in a position to
challenge, or be challenged by, Dworkin’s conception. In either case the result is two self-validating
“best” conceptions of morality, helpful and action-guiding for those already committed to them, but
unconvincing to those who do not. Now, if Dworkin believes that two such conceptions can be put side
by side and compared on some ground, then it must be on the basis of some (moral?) standard that is
outside the two conceptions, thus undermining his rejection of Archimedeanism. If he does not believe
such a standard exists, then because the validity of each conception is internal to itself, debate between
them would be not be possible.
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C. Dworkin’s Thesis in Practice
This has been a lengthy journey into questions of moral (and by implication legal) objectivity, and
in the heat of the argument the relevance of some of the questions discussed to Dworkin’s overarching
argument may have been lost. So it is time to tie the different threads together: we set out to examine
these questions of objectivity because of Dworkin’s argument that tied law’s legitimacy to judges’
finding the right (moral) answers to legal questions. And this argument seems to work only if there are
right answers to moral questions.
But perhaps the real test of Dworkin’s argument is not in the Olympian heights of abstract moral
philosophy. All of Dworkin’s arguments examined so far—his rejection of the positivist model of rules,
the idea of interpretive concepts, his peculiar defense of the objectivity, which makes objective value
depend on the existence of disagreement—should all be seen as scaffolds to a single huge construction
whose ultimate conclusion is “Therefore, courts should be actively engaged in political debate (and
decide the case in the following way).” Even Dworkin’s tendency to use similar arguments to challenge
theorists with utterly different views (like all the theorists Dworkin labels Archimedeans, or his odd
coupling of Sunstein and Hart, p. 65) makes more sense from this perspective: what matters to
Dworkin is that these theorists challenged the ultimate conclusion about the role of the courts. So the
real test of his ideas is how they play out in the workings of courts. If his arguments work in practice,
then perhaps that is all that we should care about. I turn to this question now.
Although Hercules, Dworkin’s imaginary judge who played a lead role in many of Dworkin’s
writings on the subject58 only makes a cameo appearance in Justice in Robes (pp. 53-57), his spirit
pervades the book. Dworkin still urges judges to confront the moral issues before them, and still urges
other branches of government to become more like his conception of the ideal judiciary,59 and not the
other way around.
The Herculean model manifests three aspects of Dworkin’s thought. First, the legal decision
rendered by following it is (prima facie) legitimate, because the legitimacy of judicial decisions depends
on finding the correct answer to legal questions. Hercules then is not just a good advice: significant
degree of compliance with it is required to guarantee the legitimacy of a legal system. Second, by
definition Hercules cannot be mistaken; the results of the Herculean method constitute the right
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answer.60 This implies that virtually all significant instances of disagreements among judges are the
result of judicial failure to employ the Herculean method: if we all had Herculean powers, there would
no longer be legal disagreements61 (except, perhaps, for disagreements on the application of vague
concepts to marginal cases). This is of course a corollary to Dworkin’s rejection of Archimedeanism and
belief that moral (and legal) correctness are set by the discourse, and not by anything external to it.
Hercules is simply someone capable of taking in and “computing” the entire legal-moral discourse and
thus guaranteeing the correctness of his judgments. Third, the extension of the model to legislatures is
closely tied to Dworkin’s conception of democracy that ignores the desires of majorities when those
infringe rights,62 which may be just the flipside of the argument for Herculean method: the very reasons
for trusting the judgment of Hercules are the reasons for not caring much for the plainly un-Herculean
judgments of most members of society.
Modeling adjudication and Politics (with a capital P) after the philosopher-judge has an inspiring
ring, but I will argue that Dworkin’s arguments in support of Herculean adjudication are unconvincing.
Dworkin’s focus on the question of legitimacy and his view that connects legitimacy to moral
correctness leads him to neglect what may be a far more pressing issue. My concern with Hercules is
not that he is so unlike any real life judges, as many critics have suggested.63 It is the exact opposite: it is
that when something reasonably close to the Herculean model is put in practice the results are quite
different from those envisioned by Dworkin. The United States Supreme Court is as close an example
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of Herculean adjudication as one is likely to ever find, but this implies that the Court delivers full
opinions on less than a hundred cases a year, instead of, say a thousand cases a year.64 A court that tries
to decide one case according to the Herculean approach will not be able to decide ten other cases at all.
This of course does not yet suggest that the philosopher-judge model is wrong, but it shows that it
comes with substantial costs, and these are not necessarily strictly monetary costs, but quite possibly
“moral costs” as well.
Ironically, this point can be illustrated by Sindell,65 the paradigmatic example in Justice in Robes for
the virtues of principled adjudication (pp. 7-8, 17-18, 22-23, 51, 143-44, 164-65, 208, 244, 260). This
case introduced the notion of market share liability to allow plaintiffs to get compensation in mass torts
involving multiple negligent defendants which could not be identified as the injurers of individual
plaintiffs. Dworkin uses this case as an example of how thinking on the rights and duties of the parties in
question has led the court to the right decision. But even if we believe that the court reached the right
result in this case, it is exactly this kind of case that shows the limitations of the approach Dworkin
advocates. Not only was market share liability rejected in numerous states for various reasons that have
to do both with questioning the justice in imposing such liability and the possibility of defendants being
required to pay more damages than the harm they caused, some courts were also concerned with the
manageability of handling such claims in courts.66 Even in those jurisdictions that recognized market
share liability, it was subjected to limits, which were justified by the impossibility of guaranteeing a just
or manageable process of decision-making.67 Dworkin could of course reply that these are all mistaken
decisions. But even if we were convinced by his reply, such an answer would miss the point of the
critique, which is that because of what courts are and because of the conditions under which they
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operate, the likelihood of such errors is significant. Dworkin cannot isolate Sindell as proof that his
suggested approach works and disregard the context of other cases decided in the same area that show
that it does not.
I believe, however, that there is an even more significant problem with Dworkin’s model of
Hercules, and it is that his approach is self-defeating. The Herculean model is premised on the existence
of a legal system that pursues the value of legality, the value Dworkin now sees as the fundamental value
for legal practice and thus central to understanding law (pp. 169-70).68 Chief among those is that judges
are impartial and that they decide cases not according to their personal preferences but according to
some impartial standards. What ideally makes courts a good place for deliberation is the fact that judges
are (ideally) elected on the basis of expertise and not because of political affiliation, and they operate in
an institutional environment that insulates them to some extent from political pressure, not least by the
existence of certain traditions of appropriate behavior, as well as by more tangible means such as life (or
long) tenure, and immunity from prosecution (or persecution) for their judicial decisions. Judges are
never totally politically disinterested (and in the United States probably less so than in other countries),
but the Herculean model pressures them to act in ways that counter the value of legality and in this way
undermines the distinction between law and politics.
Adjudication with a Herculean frame of mind when conducted in an environment saturated with
politics leads to outcomes that Dworkin himself deplores: the appointment of judges in the United
States has become a volatile and openly partisan battleground. Against this background prospective
judges are right to assume that they are elected on a particular political (small “p”) ticket. As a result the
Supreme Court has often become a forum of personal instead of forum of principle. There is empirical
evidence of increasing polarization and partisanship in the Supreme Court,69 supported by evidence that
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radical political groups are making a concentrated effort to advance their cause by getting their favorites
to the Bench rather than to the legislature or executive.70
Dworkin would no doubt say that this is a fundamental misunderstanding of the Herculean model,
which is premised on grounding adjudication on the correct moral principles as discovered by moral
reasoning. That may be true, but my point is that Dworkin’s model represents an ideal that cannot
succeed given certain realities about modern politics and perhaps also human nature. I must stress that
my point is not that courts must not rely on some moral or political considerations. I believe that in
some sense they have to.71 But recognizing this fact does not imply that courts should engage in moral
questions in the way Dworkin believes they should. There may be times when this may be required, but
often it will be wiser for the court to refrain from doing this, because exactly those features that courts
commonly have and because of which they seem the most appropriate forum for deliberation and moral
argument are the features that almost inevitably get lost when courts become increasingly engaged
directly in political argument.
Perhaps Hercules could engage in principled argument while remaining impartial, perhaps mere
mortals who work in the slightly less politically loaded atmosphere of the university could use the
method Dworkin favors and reach the right answers to political questions, but the combination of
political surroundings and influence and an approach to adjudication, that enjoins judges to engage in
the political debate makes the infiltration of those outcomes Dworkin laments inevitable.
There is an air of paradox to what I just said: it suggests that exactly those features that make
courts the most appropriate of all branches of government for engaging in debate on political rights and
duties will tend to wane if such debate is conducted in them. But in fact there is little mystery in
recognizing this point: courts seem the most appropriate bodies for handling such issues because (in
many countries) judges are not elected in an overtly political process, and judges are required to refrain
from partiality and partisanship. But relying on these features for assigning political matters to courts
would naturally lead to pressure that would tend to undermine those very features. This kind of self-
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defeating situation is not an unknown phenomenon.72 In the case of courts, even if we believe that the
most important general goal for courts is to participate in the fashioning of the values the state should
pursue (and in this way, as Dworkin believes, help create in society the requisite deliberative attitude
towards people’s rights and duties), pursuing those goals directly may be the wrong strategy.
Dworkin has always resisted the simplistic assertion that law is just politics, and I believe that he
was right about that. But even if false as a general proposition, it is important to bear in mind that law
may become indistinguishable from politics. When decrying an increasingly partisan Supreme Court (pp.
24, 104), as well as the fact that nominees to senior judicial positions try to reveal as little as possible of
their substantive views,73 Dworkin never stops to consider that this may be a direct outcome of the
politically engaged court he has always advocated.

D. Legitimacy Without Objectivity?
We have walked along the path paved by Dworkin with the hope of having a convincing account of
the legitimacy of law, but the conclusions we reached are disappointing. We have seen that Dworkin’s
suggestion is fraught with both theoretical difficulties and practical problems. Because Dworkin’s
account links the legitimacy of law with the objectivity of morality, once the latter falls, the former
seems to fall with it. Of course, this does not yet imply that law is illegitimate, for there may well be
other ways to establish law’s legitimacy. We may, for example, adopt Dworkin’s general view about
the relationship between law’s content and its legitimacy and be persuaded by other defenses of the
objectivity of morality and the possibility of finding the right answers to legal questions. A different
possibility is that law may be legitimate if it provides those who are subject to it a right to participate
and voice their opinion. If a decision-procedure is designed in a way that enables members of a
community to express their views and affect the content of the laws that will govern them, then
according to this view, laws may be legitimate even if we know that some people in the end of the
process will think they are wrong, and even if we have no guarantee that the course elected is indeed
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the morally right one. I believe this is a more promising route to establishing law’s legitimacy, but it is
evidently not Dworkin’s. Examining it would therefore have to wait for another occasion.

IV. INTO THE WORLD
So how are we to assess Dworkin’s project as it emerges Justice in Robes? My view is that a
measured assessment of Dworkin’s arguments, one that tries to take sides, shows that some parts of his
work are worthy of careful consideration, whereas others are unconvincing. But the ultimate test of
Dworkin’s theory in which jurisprudence is the prologue to how cases are decided, has to be the way
how theory tests in reality. Yet this is something that Dworkin, always sure of his power of reason, has
hardly troubled himself with. To be sure, he “tested” his theory on a few famous cases, but he neglected
the fact that the constraints judges face suggest that his theory might not work when it is required to
operate in a politically loaded environment or even such a mundane fact as heavy workloads.
In fact, even with the most celebrated cases, close examination reveals a story quite different from
Dworkin’s account. The Warren Court is no doubt close to Dworkin’s ideal for how courts should
perceive of their role and fulfill it, but when discussing its decisions (e.g., p. 123), Dworkin does not
even spare a nod of recognition to the literature suggesting that that Court had less influence than is
popularly conceived,74 thus highlighting the limitations of principled politics through courts that
Dworkin advocates. Furthermore, while arguably this approach had less actual impact than is commonly
perceived on the issues the Court decided, adopting something like Dworkin’s favored approach had a
significant effect on how courts in the United States are being perceived. The result was a backlash, still
visible today, that looks like the exact opposite of Dworkin’s ideals. Instead of courts serving as the
catalyst for spreading the notion of principled decision-making to other branches of government, what
happened is that courts’ decisions are increasingly described in terms of the party affiliation or personal
views of those occupying them. Dworkin is of course keenly aware of the current situation, but he
never acknowledges—let alone discusses—the possibility that it is not because his approach has not
been adopted, but because something resembling it has been, that all too often what the Supreme Court
delivers is not justice, but politics in robes.
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